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DEVELOPMENT OF PRAGMATIC COMPETENCE: AN APPROACH TO 
THE STUDY OF PRAGMATIC LANGUAGE PROCESSING 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Pragmatic competence, which is one of the components of communicative 
competence (Canale and Swain, 1980; Bachman, 1990; Celce-Murcia et al., 1995; 
Cenoz and Valencia, 1996, etc.), plays an essential role in intercultural communication 
and in foreign language acquisition (Bouton, 1996; Kasper, 2001; Gómez Morón et al., 
2009; Aquino, 2011). Research on this competence has mostly been carried out within 
the field of applied linguistics (especially in relation to the teaching/learning of foreign 
languages), with the purpose of setting goals and designing methodologies and 
assessment tests. However, the lack of theoretical reflection on the concept of 
pragmatic competence has led to its use as a catchall term including skills that might 
not even fall within the boundaries of so-called “organizational competences” 
(Bachman, 1990). 
In the study of language acquisition, the pragmatic approach has contributed 
significantly by considering certain aspects of contextualization and linguistic 
functionality that are not addressed in previous theoretical models —or, when so, not 
very successfully—. To become competent speakers, it is not enough to know a set of 
grammatical rules, but it is also necessary to understand the principles related to 
people’s inner and intentional world and to have the ability to draw inferences. 
Consequently, the development of the pragmatic component, understood as obtaining 
the knowledge required for an appropriate and effective use of language in 
communicative interactions (Ninio and Snow, 1996), is crucial to language 
acquisition.  
In the view of these circumstances, the main goal of this doctoral dissertation is 
to delve into the nature of the concept of pragmatic competence and its applications, as 
well as into its development as part of the language acquisition process. To do so, we 
have conducted an experimental study on the evolution of pragmatic processing in 
preschool and school-aged children (aged 3 to 9), using Sperber and Wilson’s 
relevance theory (1986/1995) as a supporting framework.  
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The first chapter sets out the theoretical framework. Thus, we have chosen to 
begin with the concept of pragmatics itself to explain pragmatic competence. We 
believe that vagueness —due to disagreement among authors— as regards pragmatics’ 
disciplinary scope is partly responsible for the difficulty in defining the notion of 
pragmatic competence. In fact, the lack of accuracy as regards the scope of the concept 
hinders attempts to delimit the components of pragmatic competence and its 
relationship with other competences such as sociolinguistic, cultural and, undoubtedly, 
grammatical competence.  
 Unlike other opinions and approaches that have emerged around pragmatics in 
the realm of theory, the approach of this study is aimed at coherently harmonizing the 
basic ideas related to the concept of pragmatics and its field of study. It is well known 
that pragmatics addresses language in use so that, while not central to linguistics, it 
does fall within the communication linguistics paradigm. Additionally, we believe that 
pragmatics should be clearly distinguished from grammar, although they should be 
complementary in terms of the general study of language, since there is evidence of a 
grammar-pragmatics interface that allows for the explanation of series of grammatical 
aspects and mechanisms related to the use of language in communication. 
 The link between pragmatics and rhetoric in terms of the efficient use of 
language in communicative interactions is also one of the main ideas defended in this 
study. Indeed, in line with Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2002), we observe that both seek 
successful communication —rather than identify the grammaticality of utterances—, 
and that persuasion, understood as rhetoric’s ultimate goal, is directly linked to 
perlocutionary acts, which are within the domain of pragmatics. 
 Pragmatics addresses the use of language in communication, considering both 
the linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects involved in the production and interpretation 
of specific utterances in different communicative situations. With this purpose, it 
studies the cognitive, social and cultural perspectives of linguistic phenomena, as well 
as the speaker-language relationship, paying attention to the choices made by the 
former and their effects on the listener in language exchange.    
 With regard to its object of study, we have observed that, as expected, the scope 
of pragmatics is not well-defined. In fact, the problem is that this discipline cannot be 
associated with any specific analysis unit that might be isolated and systematized. 
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Against this background, this study briefly reviews pragmatic phenomena, focusing on 
those that are most controversial, such as presuppositions, deixis or aspects related to 
conversation analysis. Although pragmatics acts at all levels of language, there is a 
series of prototypically pragmatic phenomena (only addressed by pragmatics) and 
others that are peripherally pragmatic (explained as interdisciplinary, since they are 
part of a pragmatic-structural interface). The former include speech acts, implicatures, 
politeness, irony, rhetoric phenomena, etc.; and the latter include presuppositions, 
deixis and definiteness, among others.   
 Likewise, we believe that paralinguistic, kinetic and proxemics phenomena, as 
well as those related to conversation analysis, are not among pragmatics’ priority 
objects of study. The former correspond to non-verbal communication, while the latter 
belong to a different line of study, since they describe and explain linguistic and social 
behaviour patterns. Thus, their main goal, rather than the study of language, is the 
study of how human relationships and social organization are reflected in language 
usage.       
 Finally, there is a set of principles that is also part of the study of pragmatics, 
such as the cooperative principle, relevance theory, speech act theory, the politeness 
principle, etc., which are essential tools for linguists to describe and explain 
regularities that take place in language use and communication.  
 In light of the above, it is understandable that, since pragmatics is focused on 
language in use in communication, its studies are devoted to language in context. 
When we communicate, the meaning of our utterances is conditioned by the 
circumstances in which they are issued. Consequently, given its relevance to verbal 
communication, we believe it is convenient to devote a few lines to the concept of 
context.  
 As might be expected, the notion of context may vary depending on the 
different theoretical approaches (linguistic, psychological or sociolinguistic) that make 
use of it. Current pragmatics differentiates three main types of context: linguistic (or 
co-text), situational and sociocultural, although certain authors do not include the 
latter. In this study, by contrast, we advocate the importance of the sociocultural 
context, since it is responsible for generating expectations and presuppositions that are 
shared by individuals of a specific language community, therefore facilitating the 
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interpretation of utterances. There are often sets of interiorized conceptualizations 
related to certain recurrent situations in the social context, which triggers a series of 
expectations and elements linked to such situations. Over the years, several theories 
have delimited this sociocultural context, referring to it with terms such as background 
(Searle, 1979), common ground (Clark, 1996), recursive situations (Barwise and 
Perry, 1983), mutual cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), information 
plots (Escandell Vidal, 1996), etc.   
 Similarly, we believe that the sociocultural context is decisive in determining 
so-called frames or scripts. As noted, both frames (data structures stored in our minds 
based on stereotyped situations), and scripts (sequences of actions that are carried out 
by default in familiar situations) become activated in language exchanges, allowing us 
to predict the structure of events and actions, which we complete through inferences. 
Unfortunately, no theory has managed to explain the process through which activated 
knowledge is limited to a framework, so that it may be relevant in each utterance and 
communicative event. This has raised the question about how the appropriate context 
for the interpretation of a specific utterance is chosen. According to Sperber and 
Wilson (1995), successful communication does not require interlocutors to share full 
understanding, but that it is enough for each of them to build a correct assumption of 
the other’s pragmatic knowledge and information. From among all the contexts 
available for interpreting an utterance, the listener must choose the contextual 
indicators that are relevant to that utterance and event and combine them with the 
necessary linguistic information to grasp the meaning intended by the speaker.  
 In this study, we have opted for a cognitive approach to the notion of context. 
Consequently, we define it as the body of knowledge, assumptions and beliefs that 
allow for language processing. These elements, which are stored in our memory, in 
prior discourse, or might be a result of the physical or sociocultural setting (shared 
through experience in a certain language community), are constantly elaborated on and 
updated in each specific utterance.     
 Finally, this first chapter presents the mechanisms and principles of relevance 
theory, first proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986), which has been used throughout 
this dissertation as a theoretical basis and analysis tool. This theory has been chosen as 
a framework of reference for two main reasons. First, its accuracy and convenience 
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has already proved useful in other studies related to the development of pragmatic 
skills and the difficulties it entails (Happé, 1993; Foster-Cohen, 1994; Dipper et al., 
1997; Leinonen and Kerbel, 1999; Leinonen et al., 2003; Loukusa et al., 2007). In 
fact, we believe that relevance theory lends itself to empirical research of the processes 
involved in language comprehension (many studies have confirmed its hypotheses in 
practice). Furthermore, since this theory allows for the explanation of pragmatic 
difficulties, including those affecting the quality of interactions, it is highly useful to 
design clinical interventions in patients with pragmatic language impairments.  
 The second reason, of a more theoretical nature, is its cognitive approach to the 
processes involved in communicative interaction. In other words, it explains how the 
listener is able to infer or deduce the speaker’s communicative intention and choose 
the correct interpretation, according to the context, among all those that might be 
possible. Therefore, the fact that the coding and decoding process is not enough to 
analyse the complexity of the mechanisms involved in human communication, leads to 
the necessity of applying the ostension and inference mechanism. Although they are 
both essentially independent mechanisms, they are usually combined to reinforce 
successful communication. Actually, linguistic messages may not directly encode the 
content the speaker intends to convey, but act as ostensive stimuli to attract listeners’ 
attention to the true communicative intention. 
 Accordingly, to successfully process the information underlying an utterance, it 
is necessary to recognize the intention behind the ostension. In fact, the inferential 
mechanism is based on the building of a presupposition from another one through 
deductive reasoning. However, as already observed, the strength of presuppositions 
may vary depending on how they have been reached. Obviously, a presupposition 
transmitted by other people or deduced on the basis of certain premises will not be as 
strong as those obtained from the speaker’s own experience. 
One of the simplest but at the same time most interesting ideas of Sperber and 
Wilson’s (1995) theory is that human beings process information efficiently, meaning 
that there is a tendency to balance profit and effort. According to this, the relevance of 
an utterance would depend on the relationship between the conceptual effects and the 
processing effort. When we interpret an utterance, we expect it to be relevant, which is 
why we choose a context (out of the total set of possible presuppositions) that can 
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justify such expectation or, in other words, one that maximizes relevance. This idea is 
included in the First Principle of Relevance. Likewise, all ostensive communication 
acts create a presumption of relevance that is accurate enough to guide the listener to 
the intended interpretation, an idea included in turn in the Second Principle of 
Relevance.  
 The application of these theoretical assumptions to the study of language 
communication allows Sperber and Wilson to identify a series of inferential tasks such 
as disambiguation, reference assignment and enrichment. In each of these processes 
the listener must choose the most accessible interpretation —based on contextual 
factors— according to the principle of relevance. The propositions yielded by these 
three inferential mechanisms are what in relevance theory and, consequently in this 
study, is known as explicatures.  
For their part, when interpreting implicatures listeners combine the information 
received with the presuppositions stored in the memory, obtaining a series of 
contextual effects (which are nothing but the contextual presuppositions or 
implicatures that speakers intended to convey without explicitly stating them). In the 
case of implicatures, there are two types: implied premises and implied conclusions. 
The former are created by the listener through the development of presupposition 
stored in memory, while the latter are deduced as a logical result from the explicatures 
and implied premises of utterance and context.  
 Nevertheless, although in this study we have chosen relevance theory as a 
framework of reference because of its detailed explanation of the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in the interpretation of ostensive language stimuli, we are also 
aware of its weakness and limitations when it comes to the description and explanation 
of production mechanisms. However, since our research is focused on studying the 
processes involved in the pragmatic understanding of language, this has not 
represented a problem.  
 The second chapter of the study is devoted to the definition of pragmatic 
competence and its possible applications. With this in mind, we have started by 
considering a more general concept: communicative competence. This encompasses a 
complex network of subcompetences, among which is pragmatic competence (also 
known as actional or illocutionary). This competence is sometimes defined 
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independently and sometimes in relation to other subcompetences (such as discursive, 
sociolinguistic or cultural subcompetences).  
 We have noted that efforts in the field of theoretical linguistics are mainly 
focused on the applications of the concept of communicative competence, rather than 
on the notion itself. After revising specialized manuals where we expected to find a 
definition of the disciplinary dimension and objects of study, we have observed a lack 
of in-depth consideration of the scope of communicative competence in general, and 
of pragmatics in particular. This is surprising, because one of  the goals of linguistics 
is to describe and explain the body of knowledge that allows speakers of a language to 
communicate and create a comprehensive inventory of language functions, this body 
itself being communicative competence. 
 According to this approach, we have revised the development of the concept of 
communicative competence from its origins (Chomsky, 1965; Lyons, 1970; Campbell 
and Wales, 1970; Hymes, 1972; Gumperz, 1972) to the most recent proposals (Cots et 
al., 1995; Cenoz and Valencia, 1996; Escandell Vidal, 2004a), observing how it has 
evolved, both in extension and qualitatively. Authors such as Cenoz (1996) understand 
it as a dynamic and social concept —since it belongs to the negotiation of meaning 
between interlocutors—, relative —since speakers might have varying degrees of 
competence— and speech-related —since it includes the capacity of knowing what to 
tell whom, how and when—.  
 We also consider that it is necessary to stress the difference between 
communicative competence and communicative performance, which tend to be 
confused. We understand that communicative competence includes both knowledge 
and the ability to use it and that communicative action consists of the practical 
implementation of competence in real situations of use. Likewise, when we speak of 
knowledge we refer to a speaker’s conscious or unconscious knowledge of language 
and the aspects concerning its use, while ability is a type of procedural understanding 
that refers to the skill with which such knowledge is managed in language exchanges.  
 In short, in this study, communicative competence is defined as a set of abilities 
and skills supported by knowledge (explicit and implicit) of the linguistic code, the 
sociocultural contexts (that allow us to produce suitable utterances), conversational 
rules, text organization, the cultural norms of the linguistic community, speech acts 
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based on communicative goals, etc. We have also identified two types of knowledge: 
referred to “knowing that” (declarative knowledge) and “knowing how” (procedural 
knowledge).  
 Thus, we have gradually built the basis for a sound theory of communicative 
competence. The key questions then are what “knowing” a language involves and 
which knowledge and skills are needed. However, since no linguistic discipline alone 
can describe them, it is necessary to bring several together in a collaborative task. 
Consequently, recent decades have witnessed the emergence of different models 
picturing the distribution of the different components or subcompetences that integrate 
communicative competence. Thus, we have presented and analysed the model of 
Canale and Swain (1980), revised and modified by Canale (1983), the model of 
Bachman (1990), the model of Celce-Murcia, Dörnyei and Thurrell (1995), and that of 
Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2002). It is worth noting that most of the models consulted (with 
the exception of Gutiérrez Ordóñez’s) derive directly from the area of language 
teaching, which proves the already mentioned fact that the concept of communicative 
competence is not paid due attention in the field of theoretical linguistics.  
 These models share certain similarities in terms of general features of 
classification and the inclusion of certain competences such as the linguistic, 
sociolinguistic, discursive or pragmatic competences, which are present in nearly all of 
them. Meanwhile, there are differences at several levels. On the one hand, there are 
terminological differences reflected in the terms grammatical competence and 
linguistic competence (which refer to the same type of knowledge, although the latter 
clearly includes, in addition to grammar, lexicon and phonology) or pragmatic, 
actional or illocutionary competence (which are different terms that frequently express 
very similar notions). Other differences are hierarchical and lie in certain models’ 
perception of pragmatic competence as a macrocompetence that includes the 
sociolinguistic, discursive and strategic competences, or in the situation of the 
linguistic and discursive competences in central position in relation to the rest. There 
are also disagreements as to the knowledge and skills included in each of the 
components (the boundaries between pragmatic knowledge and skills, and discursive 
knowledge and skills are frequently unclear, so that they are often confused and 
interchanged). Finally, there are differences of opinion regarding strategic competence. 
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Certain authors believe it is a marginal competence, while for others it is comparable 
to general communicative competence, because of its identification with the ability to 
solve problems, as well as to increase the efficacy of other competences.  
 In addition, most of the models presented are limited by the fact that they only 
refer to language. With the exception of Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2002), all other authors 
disregard, to a greater or lesser extent, factors such as individuals’ personality, mental 
patterns and cultural knowledge. Likewise, classifications often pay attention only to 
knowledge rather than to the skills to use it and the underlying processes. As a result, 
we present our own proposal of a theoretical model of communicative competence that 
argues, firstly, for the integration and interrelation of all subcompetences. According 
to our model, none of them is situated in central position, since we consider that they 
complement each other and are all necessary to achieve language proficiency. That 
said, we believe they can be distributed into three groups: primary competences 
(cultural and psycholinguistic), competences that revolve around the development and 
organization of speech (grammatical and discursive), and competences related to 
language usage (pragmatic and sociolinguistic). Finally, outside these groups is 
strategic competence, which includes understanding mechanisms for the compensation 
of faults and deficiencies in the rest of them.   
 With all this, our purpose is to suggest a reasoned theoretical proposal for the 
definition of pragmatic competence. Thus, according to our model, pragmatic 
competence refers to the production of utterances based on a combination of 
knowledge and skills in the use of linguistic and contextual information. This includes 
the capacity to infer from both explicit and implicit content, and to understand the 
possible correspondences between forms and functions. The purpose of this is to 
ensure that our messages are at the same time appropriate, adequate and effective.   
 However, such pragmatic knowledge is not to be understood as a set of rules 
(stored knowledge, objectified through descriptions and reflected in theoretical models 
typical of grammatical competence). The conditions of appropriateness and success of 
an infinite number of utterances cannot be defined based on a series of rules linking 
such utterances to their context and possible interpretations. This is why they should 
be viewed instead as a series of principles that guide our communicative exchanges.      
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 Subsequently, this chapter gathers the contributions found in theoretical 
handbooks of pragmatics, research on teaching/learning of second languages, and 
studies on the didactics of the mother tongue, where the notion of pragmatic 
competence is addressed or applied. 
 First, as already mentioned at the beginning of this study, it is significant that 
most of the traditional handbooks of pragmatics consulted (Levinson, 1983; Leech, 
1983; Reyes, 1990; Verschueren, 1999; among others) do not mention the concept of 
pragmatic competence. Among those that do discuss it are the works of Gutiérrez 
Ordóñez (2002), Portolés (2004) and Escandell Vidal (2006). However, Portolés 
(2004) identifies pragmatic competence with communicative competence, although the 
same author recognizes that this conception could lead to many problems of difficult 
resolution. On the other hand, Escandell Vidal (2006) considers that the inferential 
phenomenon is not part of pragmatic competence, being a processing ability that is 
common to all individuals, so that there is no specific body of knowledge to support it. 
Our stance, however, is that such knowledge is part of the “knowing how” body of 
knowledge, which is in itself the core of pragmatic competence.  
 In the foreign language teaching area, both the CEFR (2002) and its adaptation 
to the teaching of Spanish through the Curriculum Plan of the Instituto Cervantes 
(2006) contribute their own conception of pragmatic competence. Under pragmatic 
competence, the CEFR includes knowledge and skills that go beyond the field of 
pragmatics, such as cohesion and coherence (a subject of study of text linguistics) or 
interaction schema and turn-taking organization (typical of conversational analysis). 
This is also the case with the Curriculum Plan, since it gives the blending of pragmatic 
and discursive competence for granted. However, attention should be drawn to the 
appropriateness of the insistence on including the ability to achieve efficacy in 
communication as a part of pragmatic competence.  
 In addition to these works of reference, we have examined the publications of 
the proceeding of the National and International ASELE Conferences, since we 
believe they are a clear example of the type of research that is being conducted in the 
field of teaching Spanish as a foreign language. We have focused on the proceedings 
of the XV Conference, entitled “Pragmatic competence and the teaching of Spanish as 
a foreign language”. Significantly, most of the articles work on the different aspects of 
11 
 
pragmatic competence, but very few are concerned with defining its scope. 
Furthermore, their focus is neither homogeneous nor well defined. Those that discuss 
the concept resort to the definitions provided by authors of models of competence 
(Canale and Swain, 1980; Bachman, 1990; Celce-Murcia, Dörnyei and Thurrell, 1995) 
or by the CEFR (2002), they identify it with communicative competence, or they 
provide indirect definitions explaining its instances of success or failure. This lack of 
theoretical discussion on the notion of pragmatic competence results in teachers of 
second languages not knowing how to define specific activities for the development of 
pragmatic competence and its assessment.  
 The Vademécum para la formación de profesores. Enseñar español como 
segunda lengua (Teacher training manual. Teaching Spanish as a second language) 
acknowledges the importance of pragmatics in second language teacher training, 
highlighting speech acts, politeness, relevance and the interpretation of implicit 
messages as issues of particular interest in foreign language teaching tasks. Pragmatics 
is very much involved in intercultural communication, since poor pragmatic 
competence might lead to misunderstandings or to speakers coming across as impolite 
or uncooperative (Liddicoat and Crozet, 2001; Gómez Morón, 2004), which is usually 
worse than incorrectness as a result of grammatical mistakes. 
 However, in spite of the increasing importance pragmatics is acquiring in 
communication guidance and task-based learning methods, the overall picture shows 
the need for further study on pragmatic competence in the field of Spanish as a foreign 
language. Therefore, this study argues for the creation of teaching materials focused on 
pragmatic competence, which involves the need for wider dissemination of descriptive 
pragmatics of Spanish and a deeper theoretical understanding of pragmatic principles.   
 One of the first issues leading to the inclusion of pragmatic competence in the 
area of second languages is the possibility of explicitly or implicitly teaching such 
competence. Several studies mention pragmatic universals, but there are also specific 
principles that depend on the cultural patterns of each language community and are 
worthy of attention, since they can give rise to negative transfer. This has led to the 
recent development of intercultural pragmatics, which serves as a helping tool and 
conceptual basis for second language teachers (Fernández Silva, 2002). 
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 Against those who defend that competences are not taught because they are 
skills and abilities, so that the most teachers can do is facilitate their acquisition and 
development, the studies analysed provide evidence of the benefits of teaching how to 
use and develop pragmatic competence. Without guidance, many aspects of pragmatic 
competence cannot develop properly. In addition, there is also proof that the explicit 
method is more effective than the implicit and that pragmatic routines, some 
inferences and certain speech acts can be even taught when there is still a lack of 
sound grammatical knowledge. Nevertheless, there are aspects of pragmatics —such as 
certain types of implicatures— that do not improve through instruction, as shown in the 
studies of Kasper (1997). 
 After assuming the need for education in pragmatic competence, we have 
focused on how to approach the issue, comparing current practice in SL lessons with 
proposals related to pragmatic aspects that may be developed through classroom 
activities. First, we believe in the convenience of small groups and interactive student-
centred activities, so that learners might exchange the roles of speaker and listener in 
the different communicative events and in real communicative situations (Vellenga, 
2004; LoCastro, 2006). Additionally, the approach to pragmatics in the classroom 
could focus on aspects such as the study of implicit meaning, which is often context-
dependent, generalized and reaches a certain consistency; speech acts, which are often 
linked to recognizable and repeatable formulas; politeness and intercultural 
pragmatics, since teachers must draw students’ attention to the continuous process of 
inferential adjustment in communication and to the differences between their mother 
tongue and the SL, etc. Lastly, it would also be advisable for handbooks to deal with 
pragmatic principles that are usually implicitly learnt through direct observation 
(Gutiérrez Ordóñez, 2005). 
 Finally, after an analysis of the area of second language assessment, we have 
concluded that measuring pragmatic competence is extremely complex, which is why 
it is mostly left out of evaluation processes. We pose that it is not possible to analyse 
all competences directly, but that in some cases it must be done through action (Rea, 
1985), and that suitable tests can only be developed on the basis of comprehensive and 
accurate definitions of the competences to be analysed (Bachman, 1990). The 
pragmatic competence test models presented are based on questions with multiple-
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choice answers with pragmatic deviations, grammatical deviations or both, where only 
one answer is grammatically and functionally correct. In addition, although based on 
the Spanish Threshold level functions, they are lacking in some aspects: there are 
frequent instances where intelligence or certain cognitive skills are measured, rather 
than the real pragmatic capacity of the students who have performed the test. 
 Another research area that addresses pragmatic competence is didactics of 
language and literature for native speakers. This field also includes the development of 
communicative approaches aiming to go beyond purely grammatical teaching to focus 
on aspects related to language usage in real communicative situations. The purposes of 
language didactics curricula are, to a greater or lesser extent, a reflection of those of 
foreign language teaching: that students are capable of using the relevant language 
adequately and efficiently in real communicative situations to achieve their 
communicative purposes. However, there is evidence of a wide gap in the field of 
language didactics between theory and practice in terms of communication (Lomas 
and Osoro, 1996a). While in foreign language teaching communicative aims can be 
used in classroom activities, when it comes to mother tongue lessons, there has been a 
tendency to only teach grammar and perhaps certain writing skills, whereas language 
has hardly ever been regarded as a useful element for real communication (Cassany, 
Luna and Sanz, 2002). Moreover, when attempts are made, rather than communicative, 
they consist of taxonomic approaches based on text identification and classification. 
For this reason, many didactics experts claim the need for teachers’ materials and work 
to take on a communicative approach, so that students can face real language use 
situations.  
 The main goal of the different Spanish language and literature curricula of 
recent years (Ministry of Education and Science, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 2007, 
2011, 2012) is to provide students with the knowledge and skills that make up 
communicative competence. The problem is that such curricula are open, therefore 
providing general blocks of aims, contents and assessment criteria, leaving planning to 
teachers, who are also to decide upon pedagogical methods, selection criteria, teaching 
materials and assessment methods. Nevertheless, such curricula apparently already 
include pragmatic and discursive adaptations, so that language teaching is not limited 
to sentence structure, but also pays attention to the pragmatic aspects of how linguistic 
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elements relate to their production and interpretation contexts. Likewise, there is also 
evidence of the relationship between the different aims of language education and the 
different subcompetences that make up communicative competence. Thus, it falls to 
didactics to establish the competences that students are to develop depending on their 
level and to ensure they do so as effectively as possible. We also believe that the 
contents to be taught in language lessons should be chosen based on the most common 
communicative uses in our societies, which are the ones students will encounter in 
adult life. In short, the goal is to provide students with the necessary tools to 
consolidate their communicative competence, which is achieved through learning the 
necessary norms, skills and strategies.  
 The third chapter of the study addresses pragmatic competence within the 
context of language acquisition. In the 20th century, research on language acquisition 
mainly focused on aspects related to the development of phonological, lexical, 
morphological and syntactic skills. Fortunately, recent trends towards more 
communicative approaches have also found their way into the field of acquisition. 
Thus, there is evidence that the learning of the mother tongue involves the acquisition 
of certain communicative competences that go beyond knowledge of a set of 
phonological, grammatical, semantic, etc. rules. Children must learn to be competent 
in their language, using the right structures, appropriate to the context and situation 
and in line with their communicative intentions.  
 Likewise, pragmatics has been acknowledged as essential to language 
acquisition, since the most striking changes from the cognitive point of view take place 
in the area of pragmatics (Halliday, 1975; Hulit and Howard, 2002). As children grow 
up, they learn to interpret the illocutionary force of their interlocutors’ utterances, 
acquiring the capacity of knowing what to say and to whom to achieve their goals.  
 Nevertheless, one of the problems involved in addressing the acquisition of 
pragmatic competence is, once again, the lack of a clear demarcation (O’Neill, 1996; 
Bara, Bosco and Bucciarelli, 1999; Galeote Moreno, 2002). The fact that there are no 
theories that systematically cover and complete pragmatic capacities has resulted in 
the proliferation of studies that deal with the different elements of pragmatics 
separately (McTaer and Consti-Ramsden, 1992; Ninio and Snow, 1996). Thus, within 
this heterogeneous area of study, speech acts are one of the most researched 
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phenomena. Indeed, many researchers have attempted to identify the speech acts 
produced by children, the ages at which they appear and the order they follow. 
However, the actual problem lies in the lack of a homogeneous classification of such 
speech acts because of disagreements in the theoretical conception of what constitutes 
the communicative usage of speech. 
 In the literature, the most widely analysed speech acts are requests, since they 
are the most frequent in interactions involving children. Promises are also of special 
interest (more complex because of the moral and personal obligation they demand). In 
addition, studies prove that the nature of requests and the interlocutor’s status 
influence the type of requests made by children: it has been observed that requests for 
information are usually made directly and those for action indirectly, or that 
conventional requests are used to ask for favours, while non-conventional ones are 
used to demand rights (Serra et al., 2000).  
 Subsequently, we have noted the importance of certain elements that we believe 
are the basis for the development of the pragmatic component. Above all, we have 
referred to the importance of context, which plays an essential role in the initial stages 
of language development (Peralta, 2000). In fact, children begin by using language in 
their personal and immediate context, so that their first utterances are linked to “here” 
and “now”. Over the years, there is a gradual development of sensitivity to context in 
language use. Consequently, children learn to use decontextualized language based on 
the knowledge and assessment of the perspective they share with their interlocutor, so 
that their context management becomes more flexible and complex (Lloyd et al., 1995; 
Ryder and Leinonen, 2003).  
 Next, we introduce a set of factors that are closely linked to the first group of 
primary subcompetences that make up our communicative competence model 
(presented in chapter two). Such factors, according to Luokusa (2007), make 
communication possible and, therefore, the development of pragmatic competence. 
Among them are the development of sensory and motor functions, memory, attention 
skills, knowledge of the world and of one’s own beliefs, mind-reading skills and 
linguistic competence. These capacities are included in our model under the heading of 
psycholinguistics, except for linguistic skills, which, according to our terminology, 
represent grammatical competence. However, in our opinion, social and cultural 
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knowledge should be added to the list of factors proposed by Loukusa (2007), so we 
have included it under our concept of cultural competence. 
 Thus, we briefly introduce these basic factors that affect pragmatic skills. In the 
first place, sensory and motor functions are known to be at the basis of children’s 
perceptive and cognitive development as a prerequisite for communication. For their 
part, language and grammatical skills are also necessary, since to understand 
utterances it is essential to have command of linguistic units and structures, which 
means the understanding of language usage involved in the development of 
morphology, syntax, phonology and semantics. As regards the development of 
morphosyntax, the description of the different stages varies depending on the authors. 
Tomasello and Brooks (1999) establish four age-dependent stages for the grammar 
acquisition process; other authors such as Brown (1973) or Blake et al. (1993) believe 
that morphosyntactic evolution must be measured depending of the mean length of 
children’s utterances (MLU). What is clear is that the development of morphosyntactic 
competence is gradual and some of its aspects evolve jointly while others do so 
conditionally, meaning that they depend on previously acquired elements. Similarly, 
according to authors such as Owens (2003), many morphosyntactic changes are a 
reflection of the development of children’s underlying phonological system at pre-
school age, so that their ability to develop the morphological component will depend 
on their ability to identify and produce phonological units. Concerning lexical 
development, authors agree that children between 18 and 24 months of age evidence a 
sudden increase in the rate of acquisition of new words, which is known as 
“vocabulary spurt” (Mervis and Bertrand, 1995).  
 In the third place, the development of memory is another of the factors that 
facilitate pragmatic competence, since, to derive implicit meaning, for instance, it is 
necessary to develop short-term memory. According to Nelson (1986), children 
between the ages of 2 and 6 have the ability to remember representations of events 
through the development of frames within which they remember specific situations 
such as eating at a restaurant. In any case, childhood and preadolescence are the stages 
at which the capacity to store information increases (Meyers and Meyers, 2000; 
Roselli et al., 2001), together with the ability to develop strategies for the retention and 
recall of stored information (Siegel, 1994). 
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 Fourthly, we have introduced attention skills (Ruiz-Contreras and Cansino, 
2005), also linked to the development of memory. Although attention is clearly 
developed at a very early age, there is evidence that the development of auditory and 
visual attention takes place especially between the ages of 5 and 8 (Korkman et al., 
2001). Likewise, the fifth influential factor is children’s understanding of the world 
through their personal experience. Since they are born, children gradually build a 
system of ideas about the world that grows, changes and becomes updated as they live 
new experiences (Milosky, 1992). 
 Sixthly, authors point out mind-reading abilities (also called theory of mind) as 
one of the factors that are most closely related to pragmatic skills. Theory of mind is 
understood as the capacity to differentiate one’s own mental states from those of 
others. An example of this capacity is, for example, intentional deception. Thus, in the 
literature there are two outstanding false-belief tests (of first- and second-order) to 
assess theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Sullivan et al., 1994). First-order 
false-belief is based on understanding that the mental representation of a character can 
be different from reality and different from one’s own. On the other hand, second-
order false-belief requires the ability to represent not only characters’ mental state, but 
also the idea characters have of the mental states of other characters in the story. 
Authors such as Wellman et al. (2001) state that theory of mind develops when 
children are between the ages of 3 and 5, which coincides with the age of the essential 
development of pragmatic processing (Buccarelli et al., 2003) and sensitivity towards 
moral rules and self-assessment emotions —such as shame or guilt— (Abe and Izard, 
1999). 
 Finally, social and cultural knowledge are related to the concept of sociocultural 
context stated in chapter one. Children grow up as members of a specific language 
community and the development of their skills is focused on adapting to it, meaning 
that they must be aware of the sociocultural context that surrounds them. To this end, 
they will have to learn the social and cultural conditionings on verbal behaviour and its 
adaptation to different circumstances. They will also acquire a body of knowledge and 
a set of presuppositions shared by their language community, which in turn will allow 
them to choose the relevant context for each situation in order to achieve 
communicative success.  
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 This chapter also deals briefly with the different stages of children’s 
development, emphasizing its four evolutionary areas: physical, cognitive, social-
emotional and communicative (Owens, 2003). We believe that knowing what happens 
at each stage will allow for the establishment of patterns of change regarding 
pragmatic processing. Owens (2003) distinguishes the following phases: the newborn 
(from birth to the first month of age), the observer (1 to 6 months old), the 
experimenter (7 to 12 months old), the explorer (12 to 24 months old), the exhibitor (3 
to 5 years old) and the expert (6 to 12 years old). We are especially interested in the 
last two stages, since they include the age range chosen for our experimental study 
(ages 3 to 9). At the age of 3 there is a significant development of imagination, as well 
as a major increase in productive vocabulary (around 1000 words). Likewise, at 4 
Owens (2003) stresses the evolution of memory strategies together with the building of 
sentences with more elaborate syntactic structures. The development of cause and 
effect explanations, together with emotion and a certain sense of humour, takes place 
at the age of 5. And finally, the stage that Owens (2003) calls the “expert stage” is 
characterized by the evolution of inference skills, selective attention, memory skills, 
etc. that allow children to process information more effectively, learning to manipulate 
and influence others through language. 
 As mentioned at the beginning of this study, within the context of the different 
pragmatic theories, we have adapted to the framework of relevance theory because of 
its successful approach to the cognitive level. However, according to Fodor’s classical 
model (1983) there are two cognitive processes or systems: input models (such as 
grammatical skills, which operate on a precise type of stimuli and whose processing 
follows a specific pattern) and central systems (such as pragmatic interpretation, 
whose processing depends on global factors). Wilson (2003) argues that what should 
prevail in this classification is not whether the processes are global or local, but 
whether they are carried out through general-purpose mechanisms or through specific-
purpose mechanisms. Based on this perspective, theory of mind would be a modular 
system, since it has a specific inferential mechanism. In fact, there are differences 
between mind-reading skills and general reasoning skills (proof of which are Williams 
syndrome patients, whose theory of mind is adequate but whose reasoning skills are 
poor). However, the opposite phenomenon can be observed with inferential 
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communication, which in this case is considered a variety of theory of mind. Studies 
on communicative competence and theory of mind show a close link between them 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Bloom, 2000; Davier and Coltheart, 2002). Thus, in his study 
with typically developing as opposed to autistic children, Happé (1993) finds a clear 
relationship between the understanding of metaphors and first-order mind-reading 
skills, and between the interpretation of irony and second-order mind-reading skills. 
 Based on these evidences, Wilson (2003) views pragmatic skills as a submodule 
of the mind-reading modular system. Nevertheless, as stated by Igoa et al. (2011), this 
modular interpretation of inferential processes cannot yet explain how a cognitive 
system that is specialized in the induction of mental states can be both encapsulated, 
and at the same time gain access to different sources in order to complete the 
inferential process. 
 Sperber (1994) shows the relationship between pragmatic skills and theory of 
mind through 3 strategies used to interpret utterances: naïve optimism, cautious 
optimism and sophisticated understanding. In naïve optimism, the listener assumes that 
the speaker is benevolent and competent; in cautious optimism the speaker is 
understood to be benevolent but not necessarily competent; and in sophisticated 
understanding there is a realisation that speakers can be deceitful. Thus, these 
strategies are reflected in the natural evolution of children’s inferential understanding, 
since they go from naïve optimism to cautious optimism, coinciding with the 
acquisition of first-order mind-reading skills, and subsequently to sophisticated 
understanding, linked to the emergence of second-order mind-reading skills. In fact, 
our findings show evidence of naïve optimism in children between the ages of 3 and 4 
when, for example, they provide irrelevant or fanciful answers believing that what first 
comes to their mind is what listeners expect to hear. The answers of children between 
the ages of 4 and 5 reflect cautious optimism since, instead of settling for the first 
interpretation that comes to their mind, they use reasoning to provide an answer that is 
consistent with the contextual information received. Finally, children between the ages 
of 8 and 9 show evidence of sophisticated understanding in the interpretation of irony 
by being able to recognize speakers’ intentions to implicitly communicate the opposite 
of what they state.   
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 Finally, in this chapter we argue that the global task of inferring speaker 
meaning can be broken down into a series of pragmatic sub-tasks, which, according to 
Ryder and Leinonen (2003), can be categorized in terms of contextual complexity 
depending on the effort required to process them. Thus, we distinguish the following 
tasks: reference assignment, pragmatic enrichment process, implicature processing, 
interpretation of routines, identification of others’ feelings and interpretation of irony. 
These tasks have been used to design the test of our experimental study. This leads to 
the need to describe them from a theoretical point of view, as well as to introduce 
some of the already existing studies on their development. Firstly, reference 
assignment involves reference to the phenomenon of deixis. As mentioned in chapter 
one, deixis is the clearest representation of the relationship between language and 
context in language structure. Thus, to adequately interpret the linguistic messages that 
contain deictic elements it is necessary to take into account extra-linguistic factors 
such as knowledge of the identity of speaker and listener, of place and time 
circumstances, etc. Therefore, we understand the identification of referents as inherent 
to the communicative usage of language, so that it is one of the most basic tasks within 
the process of pragmatic understanding. Pragmatic enrichment is also viewed as a 
simple process that frequently takes place when we automatically and unconsciously 
resort to context, our encyclopaedic knowledge, etc. to add information that is not 
specified in the utterances.  
 In the case of implicatures, they require extra processing efforts. Listeners must 
combine received information with the presuppositions stored in their memory to 
deduce the speakers’ intended meaning through an inferential process. However, 
according to Wilson (2000), implicatures’ strength can vary depending on the 
familiarity of the utterance, so that we can distinguish between implicature and routine 
comprehension. In the case of routines, the effort required to interpret them is smaller. 
Indeed, in the context of familiar communicative situations, the inferential load of 
utterances becomes lower, since it is possible to use settled routines (Guillam and 
Bedore, 2000). 
 The task of identifying others’ feelings requires contextual processing and the 
recovery of information from different sources (Luokusa, 2007). Thus, in recent 
decades increasing interest has been shown towards the development of the ability to 
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identify feelings, related to understanding of the mental world and, therefore, to theory 
of mind (Flavell and Miller, 1998). 
 Finally, we have introduced the interpretation of irony, first because of its close 
relationship with theory of mind (Happé, 1993; Cahmpagne-Lavau and Joanette, 2009) 
and second because it is one of the most interesting pragmatic tasks from the linguistic 
and metacognitive points of view. According to Bara, Bosco and Bucciarelli (1999), 
there are two stages in the capacity to interpret ironic utterances: the first involves 
command of ironic expressions of the type “one thing is said and the opposite 
implied”, and the second requires command of more subtle inferences demanding 
metarepresentational skills.  
 Many of the revised studies on pragmatic acquisition stem from the need to 
establish typical development parameters for comparing cases of children who are 
suspected to have pragmatic language deficits. Thus, chapter four is devoted to the 
study of pragmatic language disorders and pragmatic failure, emphasizing the 
importance of pragmatics in the description and analysis of deficits in communicative 
skills. This implies that the scope of applied linguistics encompasses far more than 
second language teaching.  
 Thanks to progress in research we now know that there are communication 
disorders where there is a clear language impairment brought about by pragmatic 
failures, even when grammatical skills are not damaged, or at least not significantly so. 
Thus, children with Williams syndrome, for example, present pragmatic language 
impairments (overreliance on context, difficulties in interpreting the figurative 
meaning of jokes and irony, etc.), while formal language acquisition seems to follow 
the right order. The opposite may also happen: the pragmatic component might be 
undamaged while there are serious grammatical deficits, as in certain cases of aphasia.  
 Consequently, the emergence of clinical pragmatics in the nineties allowed for 
the identification of right-hemisphere damage as a cause for pragmatic impairment in 
tasks such as the interpretation of indirect speech acts, inference of implicatures, 
interpretation of irony, metaphors, non-literal meanings, etc. (Barroso and Nieto, 
1996). This suggests that both hemispheres are equally relevant in language processing 
(Obler and Gjerlow, 2000). 
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 Nevertheless, in spite of the huge progress represented by the inclusion of the 
pragmatic component in the research of language pathologies, in practice there are 
certain methodological problems because of the difficulties involved in its evaluation 
(Mendoza Lara, 2001). Even so, in recent years, authors have engaged in experimental 
studies focused on the different pragmatic categories and their potential for further 
research (Noveck and Sperber, 2007). 
 Consequently, this chapter reviews the main communication disorders 
involving symptoms of a pragmatic nature. Firstly, we refer to aphasia. Against the 
widespread belief that aphasia is solely related to grammatical deficiencies, the 
literature also refers to the presence of certain pragmatic effects and the existence of 
‘pragmatic aphasia’ (Joanette and Ansaldo, 1999). Nevertheless, the study conducted 
by Moreno Campos (2011) leads to the conclusion that aphasia is not associated to any 
specific pragmatic deficit, since the pragmatic categories that may be altered are 
peripheral and grammatically based.   
 Williams syndrome and right-hemisphere damage are among the conditions that 
are distinctly marked by pragmatic disorders. Among other symptoms, its sufferers 
evidence overreliance on context and major problems to understand the meaning of 
metaphor and irony, together with clear deficits in the interpretation of generalized 
implicatures (Gallardo Paúls, 2007). In the case of patients with right-hemisphere 
damage, they find difficulties in going beyond literal meaning, problems in the 
interpretation of indirect speech acts, tendency towards conversations including a 
considerable amount of irrelevant information, etc. (Blake, 2009). 
 Moreover, pervasive developmental disorders are characterized by pragmatic 
alterations that are reflected in difficulties in social interaction and understanding. The 
most representative of these disorders are Asperger syndrome and autism spectrum 
disorders. As regards autism, there are no clearly defined symptoms, since there are 
different types. Researchers agree on the fact that pragmatic difficulties are one of its 
general features. According to Martos (2001), the universal characteristic of autism 
spectrum disorders is difficulty in expressing and understanding communicative 
intentions, which is why it is often associated with deficits in understanding mental 
states, meaning a lack of theory of mind (Happé, 1993). 
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 On the other hand, Asperger is characterized by pragmatic difficulties that are 
reflected in the literal interpretation of utterances, the inability to understand irony, 
metaphors, etc. (Martín-Borreguero, 2005), and in difficulties in interpreting language 
in context, meaning situations involving social communication (Landa, 2000). 
Nevertheless, as opposed to autistic patients, the intelligence of those suffering from 
Asperger is above average and they are more skilled at language usage. Moreover, 
they often overcome false-belief tasks although, according to authors such as Frith 
(1991), this does not mean they have developed theory of mind, but rather that they 
replace it with logical deductions based on their prior experience and knowledge of the 
world. However, there is also a type of autism, high-functioning autism, whose 
diagnosis is closer to Asperger syndrome (Attwood, 2009), although it shares certain 
features with classical autism such as lack of interest in social interaction. The 
relationship between these disorders has attracted the interest of many researchers, 
leading to many studies that analyse the abilities of these groups to make contextual 
inferences and go beyond literal meaning (Dennis et al., 2001; Rapin and Dunn, 2003; 
Bogdashina, 2005). Thus, the study of Luokusa (2007) shows that difficulties in 
pragmatic understanding stand out in both children and adolescents with Asperger 
syndrome and high-functioning autism, even when all other language skills have 
developed normally.  
 Finally, attention is drawn to pragmatic language impairment, which is difficult 
to catalogue because its definition is still heterogeneous (Mendoza, 2001). According 
to Bishop (2000), this disorder is characterized by the alteration of language structure 
and a lack of social awareness, with fewer problems related to social interests. 
 With regard to clinical assessment, ordinary tests are generally useless to 
identify and analyse pragmatic disorders (Conti-Ramsden et al., 1997). The challenge 
lies in pragmatics’ subjective nature, already referred to when presenting the problems 
involved in pragmatic assessment in second language teaching. These disorders do not 
lend themselves easily to quantitative and regulatory (or prescriptive) judgements 
because of the unpredictability of answers –due to the simultaneous use of explicit and 
implicit meaning-, context dependency, etc., which is why qualitative methods are 




 The main problem with pragmatic assessment tests is that they lack reliability 
and validity criteria. Thus, even though there have been several attempts to 
systematize it (Shulman, 1985; Phelps-Terasaky and Phelps-Gunn, 1992; Prutting and 
Kirchner, 1983; Puyuelo et al., 1997), there are still certain unsolved weaknesses.  
 Likewise, there is also another form of assessment based on surveys built from 
prototypical behaviours and lists of pragmatic skills to be answered by people from the 
children’s environment (Hilton, 1990; Dewart and Summers, 1990; Bishop, 1998), and 
other types of tests focused on the observation of interaction in natural contexts (Ninio 
et al., 1994; Adams et al., 2002). The pragmatic assessment method chosen is often 
based on criteria such as children’s age or whether they are children with typical 
development or if they suffer from already diagnosed language impairments. Theories 
argue for pragmatic analysis in natural situations, but in practice there is evidence that 
establishing communicative contexts beforehand allows for the observation of a higher 
number of speech acts and pragmatic tasks.   
 Relevance theory has also been used as a theoretical framework for analysis in 
many studies about pragmatic language impairments (Happé, 1993; Leinonen and 
Kerbel, 1999; Dipper et al., 1997; Luokusa, 2007). Researchers such as Leinonen and 
Ryder (2008) argue that this theory facilitates prediction of the degree of 
communicative competence based on whether the participants have theory of mind or 
not and of which order. Moreover, attention has been drawn again to the relation 
between the ability to understand figurative language and the capacity to attribute 
mental states to others (Happé, 1993). 
 The last chapter includes our experimental study on the development of the 
pragmatic understanding of language, based on a sample of 140 Spanish children aged 
3 to 9. The main purpose of the study is the analysis of the children’s answers and 
interpretation of 6 different types of questions demanding different levels of pragmatic 
competence (reference, enrichment, routine, implicature, feelings and irony), within 
the framework of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995). Our research is 
an adaptation of the study carried out by Loukusa, Leinonen and Ryder (2007) and 
Loukusa, Ryder and Leinonen (2008) based on a sample of Finnish children, which is 
included in Loukusa’s doctoral dissertation (2007). The material consists of short 
questions about different stories set in familiar contexts, some of them visually 
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supported by pictures and others only verbal. In their answers to the questions (42 in 
total), children are expected to relate their knowledge of the world to the relevant 
contextual information to reach the expected conclusion. Likewise, when children 
provide valid answers they are asked to reason them. Thus, both answers and 
explanations that are considered inappropriate are classified into different categories 
(following the classification of Luokusa, 2007) that reflect how the child failed in 
using the relevant contextual information for the question concerned.  
 The specific goals addressed in this study are to determine whether the variables 
age, gender and type of context (visual/non-visual) influence the number of valid 
answers and explanations provided by children, analysing the contents of the incorrect 
answers and explanations, to finally compare our results with those of previous studies 
(Loukusa, Leinonen and Ryder, 2007; Loukusa, 2007; Loukusa, Ryder and Leinonen, 
2008). This allows us to check whether there are repeated patterns of behaviour in the 
development of pragmatic understanding in Finnish and Spanish children. 
 The results of the statistical analysis of the data obtained prove, as expected, 
that age is a clearly influential factor in children’s pragmatic understanding. In the first 
analysis carried out, participants were classified according to age, but since we 
detected the formation of groups with similar behaviours we considered it appropriate 
to also carry out an analysis grouping children according to education cycles. Thus, the 
data show, for example, that both in questions involving irony and in those involving 
enrichment, age has a significant impact on the number of valid answers and 
explanations, and we have been able to classify participants into four groups: 3-year-
old, 4- and 5-year-old, 6- and 7-year-old and 8- and 9-year-old children. This suggests 
that as children pass from one group to the next, their capacity to succeed in 
completing these inferential tasks increases. Children of 3 form a separate group, since 
they are not yet completely involved in the educational system that guides 
development, so that there is a series of minimum competences that the child must 
acquire. In fact, we believe that the differences found between the children in their first 
school year and the rest could be due to their different family and social backgrounds.  
 Likewise, in reference assignment questions, age is also a relevant factor, 
although the differences are not observed in consecutive age groups, but with those 
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that follow. This process proves that age certainly has a significant impact, but in age 
groups that are far from each other.  
 Consequently, one of the novelties compared to other studies is based on the 
classification of children according to the school cycle they are enrolled in. This leads 
to the formation of three groups: early childhood education, first cycle of primary 
education and second cycle of primary education, according to the Spanish education 
system established by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. The statistical 
analysis yielded that educational cycle has an impact on the number of valid answers 
and explanations given by the children. The exception to this are questions related to 
feelings, where there were no statistical differences in the valid answers and 
explanations given by children in the first and in second cycles of primary education. 
This result is not surprising, since these questions are easy for them to master, which is 
why the behaviour of these two groups is very similar. There is also evidence that 
educational cycle has a higher impact than age, since the data indicate that children in 
the same school year, but not necessarily of the same age, display the most similar 
behaviours. Because of the differences between calendar and academic year, there are 
cases where, for example, in the second year of primary education there may be 
children of 7 and others that are already 8. That said, the results obtained for 8-year-
old children in their second year of primary education are closer to those of their 7-
year-old classmates than to those of 8-year-old children in their third year of primary 
education. This was expected because of the influence of the specific academic goals 
and curricula for each school year.    
 Subsequently, we analysed the distribution of the valid answers and 
explanations within the different age groups to check whether there were differences 
among children of one same group or whether the average of valid answers and 
explanations was similar for the different pragmatic tasks. Firstly, for reference and 
enrichment questions, the distribution is generally homogeneous, although there is 
greater dispersion in the number of valid answers in the groups of 3- and 4-year-old 
children. This was also to be expected since, as anticipated, younger children are 
adapting to the education system and still have reminiscences of the education 
provided at home, whose influence contributes to their individual differences.  
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 With regard to questions involving implicatures and routines, valid explanations 
follow a similar symmetric distribution pattern that shows how evolution takes place 
as age increases. Nevertheless, valid answers to routine questions yield different 
behaviours, especially at the ages of 5 and 6. On the contrary, the answers to 
implicature questions follow the expected pattern with greater dispersion in earlier 
ages and, curiously, at the age of 6. In these cases, it would be interesting to conduct 
an in-depth study with a larger sample of children of these ages.  
 Behaviours towards feelings questions are different, since in valid answers 
dispersion goes from the totality of values in the 3-year-old children to be inexistent in 
ages 5 and above. This is because beyond this age all the children answer accurately, 
so that the mean is the total score. On the other hand, as regards the distribution of 
valid explanations to these questions, there is greater dispersion at earlier ages, 
following which there is a natural evolution until the age of 9.  
 Lastly, irony questions show great dispersion in the distribution of the number 
of valid answers, but especially in explanations, which is where the totality of values is 
reached. These data are explained by the complexity involved in the processing of this 
type of questions. In fact, there are children who are able to identify the phenomenon 
of irony, answering all the questions perfectly, and those who cannot understand it and 
fail all attempts. As observed by Wilson and Sperber (1995), recognizing irony 
involves a type of metarepresentational skills that go beyond the mere recognition of 
the proposition expressed in an utterance, literal or metaphoric. The inclusion of this 
category of questions stems from our interest in this pragmatic phenomenon and is an 
innovation with regard to the previous studies carried out with Finnish children. 
Nevertheless, since the sample is made up of children between the ages of 3 and 9, we 
have designed simple ironic utterances of the type “someone says p with the intention 
of saying no-p”. Therefore, our findings cannot be compared to those of more complex 
studies involving older children such as, for example, that of Crespo et al. (2007), 
which analyses the understanding of verbal irony in children between the ages of 5 and 
13. Nevertheless, our data match the results obtained by Nakassis and Snedeker 
(2002), who prove that at ages 5 and 6 children are able to process simple forms of 
irony, while the understanding of more subtle types of irony does not take place until 
the age of 10. Our research shows that the development of irony identification skills 
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acquires visibility between the ages of 5 and 7 and that at age 9 and above, these 
utterances are processed without great difficulty, although children are not always able 
to reason their answers. In fact, according to the metalinguistic development stages 
established by Gombert (1992), the metapragmatic stage begins around the age of 6 
and is closely related to the increase in operative memory capacity. Likewise, Bara, 
Bosco and Bucciarelli (1999) conclude that the ability to produce ironic utterances 
develops in two stages. At the first stage children gain command of simple irony (p to 
say no-p), while at the second stage they begin to use more subtle inferences until they 
reach the most complex levels of indirect irony. Nevertheless, these authors believe 
that we could only speak of the development of metarepresentational skills at the 
second stage.  
 In line with the data obtained from other studies with Finnish children (which 
prove that there is a rapid increase in the number of valid answers between the ages of 
3 and 4, and that it extends to the age of 5 in questions related to feelings), in our study 
we observed that the age where development is greater in terms of routine and 
enrichment questions was also between 3 and 4, while for questions related to feelings 
and implicatures it is between 4 and 5. As presented in chapter three, Owens (2003) 
calls the 3 to 5 age range, characterized by children’s development of their autonomy, 
the “exhibitor period”. Specifically, according to this author, at the age of 5 it can be 
said that children possess a certain sense of humour and can discuss emotions, a datum 
that is also confirmed in this study in the transition from 4 to 5 years of age. 
 In addition, these stages in the development of the understanding of contextual 
meaning could be a result from the evolution at those ages of other cognitive functions 
such as the development of memory (Oakhill, 1984; Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993), 
attention (Buckley, 2003) and theory of mind (Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2001), 
which, as stated in chapter three, constitute the basis of pragmatic skills. Specifically, 
between the ages of 3 and 4, children gather experience and their knowledge of the 
world that surrounds them increases, which directly affects their ability to draw 
meaning from context (Milosky, 1992). Differences in the level of their experiences 
could justify the variations observed among these groups. In addition, even if children 
study at the same schools, their family, cultural and linguistic backgrounds are not 
identical (Donaldson, 1992; Robinson, 1994). In any case, variations within groups 
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decrease with age, so that standard deviation in groups of 8 and 9-year-old children is 
around 0.5. In fact, variation at 9 is hardly noticeable, since almost all the answers 
provided are correct. Nevertheless, we should remember that the development of 
pragmatic understanding continues in adolescence (Vieiro and García-Madruga, 1997), 
and that the fact that they have provided adequate answers to the questions in this 
study with pre-set contexts does not mean that they are equally competent in natural 
speech.  
 Following the description of the statistics obtained in this study, and taking into 
account the means and medians of the valid answers provided by each group, we have 
been able to establish an order ranging from lower to higher pragmatic complexity in 
question type in terms of contextual demand. Thus, questions about feelings, 
reference, enrichment and routine have produced higher percentages of successful 
answers. On the other hand, implicatures and, above all, irony questions have yielded 
the lowest averages of success. These results are consistent with our initial hypotheses, 
except in the case of questions related to feelings, which (in some age groups) have 
come out above those of reference assignment, which we expected to yield a higher 
number of successful answers. Likewise, with regard to questions about routines and 
implicatures, at the onset of the study we believed they were closely related, although 
we believed that routines would be easier to process because of their relation to 
everyday topics. In this case, the data have indeed confirmed the hypothesis, but only 
until the age of 7, when implicatures no longer involve greater difficulties and results 
become even.   
 As regards the gender variable, in line with the studies conducted with Finnish 
children, we have found no statistically significant differences between boys and girls. 
The only exception is found in the 7-years-old group, and only in the case of reference 
and routine questions. Nevertheless these data may be considered casual, since p-value 
is very close to 0.05. On the other hand, there are certain studies in the field of 
neuropsychology that have yielded significant differences between sexes in language 
development. In their studies, Huttenlocher et al. (1991) and Morriset et al. (1995) 
have observed differences between boys and girls at early ages, in favour of the later, 
in tasks related to verbal productivity and vocabulary, while later studies involving 
participants aged 5 to 16 have found that boys are better than girls at discourse 
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comprehension tasks (Rosselli et al., 2004; Inozemtseva et al., 2010). However, we 
cannot draw general conclusions, since studies along this line of research are scarce 
and of varying nature. Therefore, it would be necessary to conduct further research 
into the differences between boys and girls based on a broad age range and on 
different types of communicative tasks, both at the expressive and at the receptive 
levels.  
 Likewise, although there is a traditional belief that the appearance and 
development of language takes place earlier in girls than in boys, research in the field 
of clinical linguistics shows that speech disorders affect less girls than boys, although 
the degree of affectation tends to be higher in the former (Garayzábal, 2006). Here, it 
would also be interesting to conduct thorough research with patients suffering from 
different communication disorders to be able to support these conclusions.  
 With regard to the type of context variable (visual/non-visual), the data obtained 
suggest that the lack of visual support only influences questions related to implicature 
(until the age of 6), reference (until the age of 7) and irony (only in the group of 4-
year-old children), but not the others. Thus, the data resulting from previous studies 
with Finnish children (Luokusa, 2007) agree in the fact that this variable is decisive in 
reference questions (until the age of 6) and implicature questions (at ages 4 and 6). 
However, contrary to our results, Finnish children until the age of 5 were also 
influenced by context type in enrichment questions.  
 Nonetheless, the fact that children answer correctly does not always mean that 
they have understood the question or can reason their answer. This is why we have 
also analysed the data obtained from the analysis of children’s explanations. Here, as 
expected, the percentage of success is lower than that obtained for valid answers. 
Reasoned explanations of an answer require metacognitive skills. Thus, there are cases 
where certain children aged 3 and 4 are able to reason some of their answers, which 
would imply that they are beginning to develop their metapragmatic conscience 
(Gombert, 1992; Verschueren, 2000). Moreover, this would support the theory posed 
in previous studies (O’Neill, 1996; Ryder and Leinonen, 2003) suggesting that 
younger children can already use contextual information correctly, provided that the 
context is familiar and the question easy.  
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 Our graphical comparison of the evolution of valid questions and answers for 
each category has proved that both in questions involving feelings and in those of 
irony and routine there is an upward progression as age increases. However, in 
implicature questions there is a point of intersection at the age of 6, when the number 
of valid answers matches that of valid explanations. Moreover, surprisingly, at the age 
of 6 the number of valid answers is a little lower that for children aged 5. This datum 
is probably casual, but it would be interesting to devote a more comprehensive study 
to the analysis of this type of questions in that age range. 
 Our second goal is the analysis of the contents of inappropriate answers and 
explanations. From the onset of this study, we have considered mistaken answers and 
explanations to be highly useful to determine the types on non-relevant information 
used by the children and the conversational strategy they have followed. As already 
mentioned, our research is based on the classification of incorrect answers of the study 
of Loukusa (2007) into the following categories: incorrect focus, knowledge of the 
world, given information, don’t know, irrelevant, tautological, turn-taking, no answer, 
and others. We believe the first three are the subtlest, since they are the closest to valid 
answers. In them, children have not accurately identified the focus of the question, 
have overgeneralized their knowledge of the world and personal experiences, or, on 
the contrary, have attached excessive importance to the additional information 
provided by the question’s context. As regards the categories irrelevant, tautological 
or turn-taking, they are more simple and typical of younger children. Children are 
aware that an answer is required, so that they say what first comes to their mind, they 
repeat the question or part of it, or they use adjacency pairs such as how/like that to 
answer. Finally, as regards don’t know and no answer, children might either be sincere 
because they really cannot answer, or prefer to remain silent rather than providing a 
wrong answer.  
 In our study, the most frequent category of incorrect answer provided by 
children aged 3 to 6 was don’t know, followed by knowledge of the world in ages 4 to 
8. Meanwhile, in the age groups of 7 and 8 the incorrect focus was the most frequent, 
which, as mentioned, is the closest to a valid answer. Most of these results agree with 
those yielded by the studies with Finnish children; however, in their case the don’t 
know answer was provided with surprising frequency in the 7-years-old age group. 
32 
 
This might be due to cultural reasons, as suggested by Letts and Leinonen (2001), who 
had obtained similar results for this age in previous studies with Finnish children. It 
seems that Finnish children around the age of 7 prefer to say they do not know the 
answer when they are not completely sure. Nevertheless, in the case of Spanish 
children, at the age of 6 the don’t know answer is also the most frequent with 31%, so 
that we could relate the causes based on age proximity.  
 Concerning the content of incorrect explanations, they mainly follow the pattern 
found for incorrect answers. At earlier ages children frequently provide simpler 
answers (tautological, irrelevant, turn-taking), which is hardly ever the case with older 
children, where the most common are the categorized as incorrect focus, knowledge of 
the world and given information. With regard to the study with Finnish children, it 
should be highlighted that the turn-taking answer is not only common among children 
aged 3 and 4 (as is the case with our sample of Spanish children), but it is also frequent 
in the rest of age groups. Furthermore, as regards the ability to reason their answers, it 
is curious that the results yielded by Spanish children match those for Finnish children 
in that the questions they find easier to answer are those related to feelings, over those 
related to routine. The reason for this could be that they might be part of their daily 
life, so that they are quite familiar with the expression or identification of feelings in 
others, as observed by Loukusa (2007). 
 Finally, our last goal has been to compare, as far as possible, our data with those 
provided by previous studies with Finnish children (Luokusa, Leinonen and Ryder, 
2007; Luokusa, 2007; Loukusa, Ryder and Leinonen, 2008). All this leads to the 
conclusion that the results are mostly matching, except for minor exceptions that we 
have included in the different sections. For this reason, we pose that the pattern 
followed in the development of pragmatic understanding does not depend on an 
individual’s mother tongue. In addition, we have observed a gradual increase with age 
in children’s ability to access relevant information to accomplish the comprehension 
process. Thus, we agree with pioneering research in that pragmatic understanding 
skills can be defined as the ability to use relevant contextual information.   
 As mentioned in chapter four in relation to pragmatic language impairments, in 
clinical research it is important to have a typical evolutionary pattern to be able to 
detect whether a child’s development is within the parameters established for typical 
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development, or whether there are deviations or impairments. As observed by Bara, 
Bosco and Bucciarelli (1999), there are no theories that systematically cover the 
development of pragmatic skills, nor is there a protocol to assess the normal stages at 
which children are expected to produce or interpret different speech acts. Thus, 
without comparable data regarding typical development, it is impossible to 
systematically study pragmatic impairment. In the light of the above, the convenience 
and relevance of research on children’s development of skills such as pragmatic 
comprehension seems clearly relevant.  
 With regard to the assessment method chosen for this study, restriction to a 
specific task limits the validity of quantitative tests of a categorical nature, such as the 
one used. We also know that the interview structure of our study could influence 
participants’ utterances. As reckoned by Gallardo Paúls (2002), it would be advisable 
to assess pragmatics through a more flexible turn system, or through the natural 
observation of spontaneous conversations. However, this method also poses 
difficulties such as the time involved in its implementation and follow-up and the 
difficulty to control all the variables that might influence linguistic behaviour (Ervin-
Tripp, 2000). Similarly, assessment in natural contexts provides fewer opportunities to 
observe certain speech acts, since the fact that children do not produce them while 
being watched does not mean they are not part of their repertoire (Iacono et al., 1996; 
Prutting and Kirchner, 1987). Therefore, the most appropriate form of pragmatic 
assessment would be a combination of natural observation with predesigned 
conversational tasks and scheduled interaction (Bishop and Adams, 1989). 
We also believe that one of this study’s strengths is the use of pre-established 
situations, whose contexts children find familiar, accessible and convincing. Even 
though they do not reflect the exact degree of difficulty involved in natural interaction, 
they come close to the communicative situations faced by children on a daily basis. 
Furthermore, they facilitate the categorization and analysis of the answers by showing 
whether children have overgeneralized their world knowledge, based their replies on 
presuppositions that are irrelevant to the context or on pre-existing information, etc.   
The second strength of this study is the theoretical framework that supports it, 
namely, relevance theory. This theory combines theoretical reflection and the 
possibility of empirical verification, in line with the experimental studies of cognitive 
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psychology. As observed by Leinonen and Kerbel (1999), relevance theory explains 
why, for example, a specific utterance is problematic in a particular context, or the 
reason for certain failures in the process of pragmatic comprehension (poor knowledge 
of the world, difficulties to access relevant information, difficulties in the cognitive 
process of inference, difficulties to identify what others’ know, etc.).  
For Sperber and Wilson (1995), inferential communication is an unclear 
process, since it is based on the listeners’ building of suppositions from a series of 
contextual evidences. Children are often unable to assess the available information to 
build relevant premises or to access relevant information, so that they choose 
inappropriate interpretations. This means that children may have problems assessing 
speakers’ cognitive skills, which can also be identified with a lack of development of 
theory of mind, as suggested by many experimental studies (Shields et al., 1996). It 
must be recalled that relevance theory is a cognitive communication theory, since it 
attaches great importance to the allocation of mental states between interlocutors, to 
inferential capacity and to the ability to create metarepresentations. In fact, 
metacognitive knowledge (understanding of one’s own mental processes) is crucial to 
children’s language acquisition and to their ability to use it successfully in 
communicative exchanges, which can be observed from the analysis of the 
explanations gathered from the participants in our experimental study.  
 In this work, we have defended the importance of the pragmatic perspective in 
the study of verbal exchange in children’s speech, although, as observed by Fernández 
Pérez (2006), research has not yet analysed the features of communicative efficiency 
in children as thoroughly as would be desirable. This calls for further study of 
language acquisition focused on the strategies and resources they use to communicate.  
In the language acquisition process, children must develop a series of cognitive 
mechanisms that are essential for communication: a language apparatus for encoding 
and decoding messages, pragmatic skills to infer or deduce speakers’ communicative 
goals and choose the correct interpretation, and theory of mind to act as a bridge 
between the linguistic and pragmatic apparatuses by providing the necessary tools to 
draw relevant information from the discursive context (Camacho Toboada, 2005). 
Thus, to be effective communicators children must be able to allocate mental states 
and representations to other interlocutors (Bara, Bosco and Buciarelli, 1999) and 
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assess facts by applying their own knowledge and experience of reality and the world 
around them. 
 Suggestions for future research could be to design new qualitative tests, 
including pragmatic tasks of comprehension as well as of production, and conducting 
studies focused on children’s explanations of their first answers. It would also be 
advisable to develop tests for a larger sample of children, with different mother 
tongues and cultures, to obtain more input on the process of acquisition and 
development of pragmatic competence.  
 Finally, the fact that there are many studies that state the existence of a link 
between mind-reading abilities and pragmatic skills (Happé, 1993; Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Surian et al., 1996; Happé and Loth, 2002), paves the way for further lines of 
research to explore the relationship among cognitive, pragmatic and social language 
functions, especially in connection with irony.  
